Business and human rights indicators, ratings, and indices have proliferated in the past few years. Yet, measuring respect for human rights by corporations is not an easy task. This article offers an overview of the most prominent business and human rights measurement initiatives and draws attention to the normative, methodological, practical, and political challenges related to the production of valid and emancipatory measures of corporate respect for human rights. The objective is to move the debate forward, from the "if" (whether to use indicators) to the "how" (how to create better initiatives). 
Since 2011, key elements of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights have been internalized by international organizations, standard-setting bodies, governments, multi-stakeholder initiatives, civil society organizations, and business enterprises themselves. To mention just one example for each category, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has updated its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and added a chapter on human rights that explicitly draws on the GPs; 5 ISO26000, a new social responsibility standard adopted by 93 percent of the membership of the International Organization for Standardization, has a human rights clause that is closely aligned with the UN Framework; 6 the British government published a National Action Plan to implement the GPs where it set out clearly the expectation that "the UNGPs guide the approach UK companies should take to respect human rights wherever they operate"; 7 the Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy of the Global Network Initiative explicitly recognize that "Information and Communications Technology (ICT) companies have the responsibility to respect and protect the freedom of expression and privacy rights of their users"; 8 the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) published a guide for civil society organizations on how to use the GPs to support local communities, workers, and other rights holders;
9 Nestlé has partnered with the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) to conduct a human rights gap analysis of its corporate policies and procedures. 10 This unprecedented convergence around a common set of standards-together with the advent of technological innovations that permit one to easily obtain information about the human rights footprint of brands and products all around the world-has spurred widespread interest in how to measure whether, and to what extent, corporations are meeting their responsibility to respect human rights. It comes as no surprise, then, that indicators, ratings, and indices have taken center stage as one of the most promising developments in the business and human rights field. Indicators derived from the GPs are now included in management tools (for example, the GoodCorporation Framework on Human Rights), reporting standards (for example, the Reporting and Assurance Framework Initiative led by the organizations 5 . oRGanisation foR eConoMiC Co-opeRation and developMent, oeCd Guidelines foR Multinational enteRpRises 31 (2011). 6. inteRnational oRGanization foR standaRdization, ISO 26000, at Sub-Clause 6.3 (2010 Shift and Mazars), sustainability indices (for example, FTSE4Good), working methodologies used by providers of information on corporate performance with respect to environmental, social, and governance issues (for example, EIRIS), multi-stakeholder initiative certification schemes (for example, the Responsible Jewellery Council Assessment Workbook), and ethical ratings (for example, the Draft Business and Human Rights Index proposed by RightsBusiness). The Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises-the UN body with the mandate to promote the effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the GPs-confirmed the relevance of the topic on several occasions. In 2012, it suggested, "States and business enterprises should scale up and sustain efforts to implement the Guiding Principles, including...by establishing measurable and transparent indicators to assess their effective implementation."
11 In 2013, it specified, "[T]he development of performance indicators that can be used by stakeholders to encourage proper functioning of grievance mechanisms is important and can be used by stakeholders to understand how grievance mechanisms at the operational level are working and to hold business enterprises accountable."
12 Ruggie himself recently advocated for additional efforts in measuring business and human rights results:
Human Rights Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles has generated a wide array of implementation measures, national and international, public and private. But no systematic assessment is available of overall results to date. There are only anecdotal fragments, which may merely reflect observers' prior preferences. The Council's considerations of where and how it can strengthen its own 2011 implementation agenda should be informed by a more robust evidentiary basis…Therefore, my first suggestion is that the Council arrange for an assessment of major changes in policies and practices that have resulted from the uptake of the GPs, and where such efforts are falling short. 13 The benefits of indicators mainly derive from the potential for standardization, aggregation, and ultimately, comparability of human rights information over time and across companies. The production of valid business and human rights indicators could be useful for:
• companies that want to manage their human rights risks and track their progress in the implementation of the GPs;
• investors and consumers who wish to compare the human rights performance of different corporations;
• auditors who are asked to verify the accuracy of human rights policies and due-diligence processes;
• governments willing to adopt evidence-based protective measures;
• local communities that are concerned about the human rights footprint of the companies operating in their environs;
• human rights advocates who monitor the human rights impacts of corporate actors;
• researchers who are interested in exploring the drivers of responsible corporate behavior.
14 Notwithstanding these promises, measuring human rights is not an easy task. 15 In particular, business and human rights indicators risk producing (1) invalid results and (2) non-emancipatory effects. First, by simplifying and standardizing complex but partial data, indicators often depict misleading pictures of corporate performance. Second, the way in which indicators are currently produced disempowers human rights victims and legitimate centers of power-such as the Human Rights Council and national parliaments-at the expense of distant Economic, Social, and Governance (ESG) experts. Quantifying specific aspects of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights might also end up condoning human rights abuses and giving unwarranted prominence to easily measurable, though not necessarily more important, issues.
Against this background, which includes a shortage of public discussion on the topic, 16 this article maps the business and human rights measurement landscape and draws attention to its more problematic features. The article is structured as follows. reader to a representative sample of measurement initiatives in the business and human rights field. Section IV explains how to align indicators with the GPs, but also highlights the problems deriving from the fact that the GPs have left many normative questions unanswered. Section V displays the most daunting methodological and practical challenges to produce valid business and human rights indicators. Section VI emphasizes that indicators are not simple technical tools, but in fact, their production poses important political questions. The conclusion suggests the use of judgment-based measures, like standard-based ratings and surveys, and calls for additional research on specific initiatives. The ultimate objective is to move the discussion forward, from the "if" (whether respect for human rights by corporations can be measured) to the "how" (how to produce valid and emancipatory indicators). While this article represents, to the knowledge of the author, the first academic reflection on the challenges and opportunities offered by business and human rights indicators, it builds on a substantial base of research regarding state-focused human rights measures.
17 Indeed, Raworth acknowledged, "Although the framework of international law is only one particular conception of human rights, and its focus on state conduct alone is considered by many to be problematic, the issues that arise in the attempt to develop indicators under this framework are also relevant to alternative conceptions of rights."
18 Still, the results from this literature cannot simply be copied and pasted to the new field. First of all, the evolution of business and human rights norms is still in its infancy in comparison with state-focused human rights law. Second, state obligations and corporate responsibilities are fundamentally different: While states are generally responsible for all human rights violations committed under their jurisdiction, the problem of attribution is much more complex for corporate abuses. 19 These differences justify the decision to also draw some insights from the academic literature on measuring corporate social responsibility issues.
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II. BUSINESS ANd HUMAN RIGHTS INdICATORS
The traditional way to assess the human rights performance of a company is to look at the individual level, take context into account, and offer information in narrative form: A judge, a treaty body, and a human rights NGO retrace the events leading to an alleged human rights abuse suffered by an individual, or a group of individuals, and ascertain whether the corporation met its responsibility to respect human rights and/or complied with relevant obligations under national and international law. For instance: In 2010, activists filed a lawsuit before a Canadian Court against a Canadian mining company-Hudbay Minerals-over the alleged murder of Adolfo Ich Chamán, a respected Mayan Q'eqchi' community leader and an outspoken critic of the harms caused by mining activities in Guatemala. The claim centered on an allegation of human rights abuse against an individual, took the context of potential complicity with other private actors into account, and described the event in narrative form: The judge was called on to decide While the individual-contextual-narrative approach is appropriate to determine whether a company abused the human rights of a specific individual or group of individuals, it suffers from important limitations if the objective is to measure the human rights performance of a company in general terms. How is one to know whether abusive behavior in a specific case is the rule or just an exception? How is one to compare and aggregate information from different projects, factories, countries of operation, and so on? The move from the specific to the general is where business and human rights indicators step in.
In an imaginary continuum of human rights measures, indicators-the building blocks of ratings and indices-sit on the opposite end of the individual-contextual-narrative approach. 23 Indicators simplify and standardize human rights data, often taking context out of the equation, in order to aggregate different pieces of information and permit their comparison.
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In addition, they take no narrative form. 25 A business and human rights indicator can be defined as a "named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected [human rights] performance" of a corporation and whose results are conveyed through a self-contained verbal or numerical expression, such as a count (257), a percentage (15 percent), or a verb (agree/not agree). 26 The 
III. BUSINESS ANd HUMAN RIGHTS MEASUREMENT INITIATIvES
According to AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret Satterthwaie, " [I] t is fair to say that there is an emerging market in human rights indicators."
27 This is particularly true with respect to business and human rights. While the synopsis below briefly portrays a representative sample of initiatives that measure the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, Table 2 offers a more comprehensive overview of the business and human rights measurement landscape. The objective is to demonstrate that all corporate stakeholders have showed lively interest in measuring respect for human rights by corporations and that the production of indicators has already become a standard practice within the business and human rights community.
A. Management Tools
According to the GPs, "In order to verify whether adverse human rights impacts are being addressed, business enterprises should track the effectiveness of their response". In addition, " [t] 
B. Reporting Frameworks
The GPs require that, in order to account for how they address their human rights impacts, "business enterprises should be prepared to communicate this externally." External reporting "should cover…indicators concerning how enterprises identify and address adverse impacts on human rights." 32 The Global Reporting Initiative's (GRI) G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, which are widely recognized as one of the most authoritative sustainability reporting standards in the market, now include a specific section on human rights. 33 The Human Rights sub-Category consists of twelve indicators and "covers the extent to which [due diligence] processes have been implemented, incidents of human rights violations, and changes in stakeholders' ability to enjoy and exercise their human rights. Among the human rights issues included are non-discrimination, gender equality, freedom of association, collective bargaining, child labor, forced or compulsory labor, and indigenous rights." 
C. ESG data Providers and Sustainability Indices
Financial institutions and investors are expected to meet their responsibility to respect human rights by using their shareholders' rights to engage with the managers of controversial companies in which they invest, or by screening abusive corporations out of their portfolio. 35 Both strategies require the ability to measure and compare corporate performance over time and across companies. 36 To meet this expectation, responsible investors usually purchase human rights ratings from specialized providers of information on ESG corporate performance. 37 For instance, Sustainalytics instructs its eighty analysts to use specific human rights indicators in order to track companies' preparedness in managing their exposure to human rights risks and their performance in respecting human rights. 38 In addition to providing specific information to certain financial clients, ESG data providers supply raw data for the creation of sustainability stock indexes. 39 The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI), for instance, use RobecoSAM's annual Corporate Sustainability Assessments (CSA) to assign companies a Total Sustainability Score between 0 and 100 and detect sustainability leaders: Only the top 10 percent of companies from each industry are included in the indexes. 40 The 
d. Sustainability Standards
The development of business and human rights standards for specific industries, regions, or vulnerable groups often takes place through multi-stakeholder initiatives-that is, formal platforms that bring together the expertise of representatives of government, business, and civil society. 43 Many of these initiatives have produced indicators to assess the performance of participating companies and, in specific cases, certify their meaningful participation. For instance, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) is a multi-stakeholder initiative that promotes implementation of a set of principles that guide oil, gas, and mining companies in their engagement with public and private security providers to ensure that human rights are respected in the protection of corporate facilities. 44 In 2013, fourteen VP corporate participants created the Key Performance Indicators (KPI) Volunteer Group and developed assurance mechanisms to validate implementation of the VPs. 45 Explicitly drawing on the GPs, KPI No. 6 asks whether "the company has a procedure or mechanism to address human rights incidents by public/private security forces relating to the company ' 
E. Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) Tools
According to the Guiding Principles: "In order to gauge human rights risks, business enterprises should identify and assess any actual or potential adverse human rights impacts with which they may be involved either through their own activities or as a result of their business relationships." 47 Companies operating in difficult environments increasingly respond to this requirement by conducting project-level HRIAs, whose fundamental purpose is to provide a reasoned, supported, and comprehensive answer to the question: How does the project affect human rights? 48 In 2012, NomoGaia produced a "Human Rights Impact Assessment Toolkit," which recommends a four-phase process for HRIAs. 49 Phase II, entitled "Human Rights Topics Catalogs," is dedicated to identifying baseline human rights conditions in the project area, against which project impacts can be compared. Human rights issues are divided into more than 300 topics and subtopics, or indicators. Each subtopic is associated with an impact score for the intensity and extent of impact likely to result from project activities.
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F. Ethical Ratings
As responsible citizens can influence corporate behavior through their consumption practices, such as ethical shopping and boycotts, 51 While the OHCHR focuses on state obligations, and therefore locates this framework in international human rights covenants and their interpretation by relevant treaty bodies, the obvious normative framework for the business and human rights community is formed by the GPs.
A. Three Lessons from the GPs
The GPs offer three implicit but unambiguous requirements on the production of indicators to measure corporate respect for human rights. First of all, indicators should not limit their focus on those human rights issues that have significant financial consequences for the company: "Human rights due diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk-management systems, provided that it goes beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include risks to rights-holders. rights into HRIAs. Following the GPs, the two organizations specified that material issues in a children's rights context should "reflect the perspective of children as key stakeholders; they are considered in terms of the impact experienced by or particular risks facing children." 56 In contrast with this approach, many measurement initiatives still concentrate only on those factors that directly affect the bottom line of the company. For instance, the methodology used by RobecoSAM for the creation of DJSI "focuses on sustainability criteria that are financially relevant to corporate performance, valuation, and security selection. Not only does this make the results of the CSA assessment particularly relevant for investors, but it also helps companies to focus on sustainability issues that are more directly linked to their success as a business." 57 Second, indicators should not follow the CSR strategy of computing positive contributions to human rights protection, such as philanthropic activities.
58 According to the GPs, "Business enterprises may undertake other commitments or activities to support and promote human rights, which may contribute to the enjoyment of rights. But this does not offset a failure to respect human rights throughout their operations." 59 The Human Rights Matrix, developed by the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, rightly distinguishes between two types of indicators: the Essential and the Beyond Essential steps that a business can take to develop and implement its human rights strategy. Examples of Beyond Essential activities include diversity programs, education or health initiatives aimed at a local community, and participation in sector initiatives. 60 Third, the literature on state-focused human rights indicators offers a three-layered categorization of structural, process, and outcome indicators: Structural indicators "reflect the ratification and adoption of legal instruments"; process indicators measure duty bearers' procedures to implement their human rights commitments; and "outcome indicators capture individual and collective achievements that reflect the state of enjoyment of human rights in a given context. Policy indicators appraise the extent to which a company has committed to respect human rights. As statements of policy are usually publicly available and easily accessible, all business and human rights measurement initiatives include policy indicators. Yet, these indicators are rarely fully aligned with the GPs. Existing indicators are often framed as binary options: either the company adopted a human rights policy, or it did not. For instance, RobecoSAM's CSA asks whether a company "has publicly committed to support the Universal Declarations of Human Rights," as well as "if [ 67 Furthermore, policy indicators should assess the extent to which statements of policy refer to a limited or broad range of human rights and/or stakeholders. Sustainalytics, the ESG data provider for STOXX ESG Leaders Indices, competently checks whether companies have a policy not only on human rights in general (indicator S.4.2.1), but also on freedom of association (S.1.1), working conditions (S.1.1.1), elimination of discrimination (S.1.2), the sourcing of coltan (S.2.1.3), data privacy (S.3.1.3), and indigenous people and land rights (S.4.2.9).
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According to the GPs, statements of policy are only one part of the story. In order to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved, business enterprises should also have in place two types of processes (appropriate to their size and circumstances): (1) "[a] human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights," and (2) "[p]rocesses to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute." 69 Process indicators include both due diligence and remediation indicators. For instance, the DIHR's HRCA asks companies both whether, "[i]n countries where birth certificates are not common, or are frequently falsified, the company has a procedure for estimating the age of employment for young candidates, such as average height or knowledge of historic events," 70 and whether "[w]orkers have access to a grievance mechanism where they can report incidents of discrimination, and they are familiar with the mechanism." Process indicators can assess inputs-that is, the financial, human, material, technological and information resources used for the process-or outputs-that is, the actual completion of activities. As outputs depend on factors that vary from place to place, there is no monotonic relationship between inputs and outputs. The consequence is that preference should be given to output, over input, indicators.
72 Indicator HU1.d of the Global Compact Self-Assessment Tool, which asks companies whether "workers and managers are trained to respond to workplace emergencies; first aid kits and fire extinguishers are readily available; and escape exits are clearly marked and free from obstruction," 73 is more informative than indicator S09-02 of the KPIs for ESG 3.0 proposed by the Society of Investment Professionals in Germany in conjunction with the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies, which asks companies to report the "total spending in monetary terms i.e. currency on maintenance and safety of production sites, plants etc." 74 Impact indicators concentrate on the adverse human rights impact with which the company is involved. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights "requires that business enterprises: (a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they occur [and] (b) [s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts." 75 A good example of an impact indicator is EO100™ Standard's Performance Target 2.3, which checks if the "operator has not been found guilty (i.e., final verdict of guilty after exhausting all appeals) of a violation of human rights for any of its activities in the country of operation, within the previous three years."
76 While impact indicators should evidently represent a cornerstone of human rights measurement, assessing causation and contribution of-or linkage to-adverse human rights impact is difficult and often highly controversial. The most daunting methodological and practical problems associated with comparing the human rights performance of different companies will be addressed in Section IV.
Before moving on, it is worth stressing why defining a clear distinction between policy, process, and impact indicators is particularly important. First of all, it helps to create a comprehensive set of indicators that covers 72 all different aspects of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. 77 Second, it compensates for the limitations of each type of indicator: On the one hand, policy and process indicators reward statements and procedures that are not necessarily related to improvements on the ground; 78 on the other hand, impact indicators focus on past corporate behavior and therefore offer imperfect guidance with respect to changes in corporate attitude and future performance. Third, the distinction permits research on the consequences of different policies and processes on actual impacts. Are good scores on impact indicators associated with good scores on policy and process indicators?
B. Open Questions
Human rights scholars agree that conceptual clarity is a fundamental prerequisite for meaningful measurement: "[C]areful conceptualization is not an afterthought. If one's measure is not carefully conceptualized, it will likely suffer grave risks to validity, no matter how artfully it is later operationalized." 79 Unfortunately, while the GPs offer some guidance on what business and human rights indicators should look like, they also leave many questions unanswered. As acknowledged by RightsBusiness, the GPs "do not appear to operate or have been designed as an index and are not always expressed in a measurable format. This may allow for some choice in selecting metrics for the index and being flexible about a lack of granularity and specificity and measurement." 80 What this means is that the production of numerous business and human rights indicators is not a merely technical exercise, but an implicit normative process in which new standards are actually created. 81 Two examples should suffice to show that producers of business and human rights indicators cannot avoid making difficult and controversial normative decisions.
As resources are scarce and time is limited, producers of indicators often must decide on which human rights, and which aspects of the GPs, to concentrate. 82 With respect to which human rights to prioritize, the GPs are clear that "the severity of a potential adverse human rights impact is the most important factor in determining the scale and complexity of the processes the enterprise needs to have in place in order to know and show that it is respecting human rights."
83 Yet, the concept of severity is open to different interpretations. FTSE4Good Inclusion Criteria for the Global Resource Sector appropriately require "a stated commitment to respecting indigenous peoples' rights." However, no other vulnerable stakeholder is taken into consideration. 84 Labor indicators for RobecoSAM's CSA cover nondiscrimination and freedom of association, but neglect issues as important as child labor and forced labor. 85 Are these omissions justified? With respect to which aspects of the GPs should be given priority, producers of indicators are often lured into the strategy of concentrating on those facets that can more easily be measured. Yet, "not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted." 86 The risk is that those aspects that are more difficult to measure will fly under the radar and will be tacitly ignored. 87 For instance, GRI indicator G4-HR10 asks companies to "[r]eport the percentage of new suppliers that were screened using human rights criteria." 88 The indicator arguably operationalizes the due diligence requirement to "[s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts." 89 good practice to screen suppliers, but the most important consideration is a company's willingness to act in case of controversial findings. The indicator implicitly incentivizes companies to screen suppliers without taking actions after the screening.
Second, adverse human rights impacts have different dimensions: severity (killing two union leaders is arguably worse than wounding them), frequency (wounding a hundred employees is arguably worse than wounding ten), and range (wounding three saboteurs and their seven innocent children is arguably worse than wounding ten saboteurs). 90 In the business and human rights community, no consensus exists regarding how many dimensions impact indicators should take into consideration, or regarding how these dimensions should be weighed against each other.
91 How does one compare the killing of two union leaders with the wounding of twenty indigenous women? The structure of Oxfam's Behind the Brands Scorecard is such that no "artificial" weighting was applied. This means that "[e]ach indicator [was] weighted equally within each indicator category; each subindicator [was] weighted equally within each indicator."
92 Against Oxfam's position, it is worth stressing that equal weighing is as artificial as any other option-in this case, a non-decision actually is a decision. Suffice it to say that the consequence of equal weighting of indicators and sub-indicators is that "commitment to uphold the GPs" originally weighed 12.5 out of 100, while "endorse[ment] of the UN Women's Empowerment Principles" weighed 20 out of 100. 93 Unfortunately, there is no correct answer to these normative questions. Human rights experts themselves disagree on how to interpret "severity," on the priority to be given to specific aspects of the GPs over others, and on the importance of different human rights or different dimensions of the same right. 94 Yet, the drafting history of the GPs teaches us that there can be legitimate answers as a result of transparent and participatory processes. In the end, this was Ruggie's secret to success. The authority of the GPs, to a large extent, stems from the perception that their drafting process was more transparent and participatory than any prior initiative.
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Ruggie is often pleased to recall that the GPs were developed "with the involvement of all stakeholder groups, and nearly fifty international consultations on five continents." 96 The lesson to be learnt is that the questions outlined above should not be answered by a group of like-minded individuals, however knowledgeable and authoritative they may be. 97 Rather, decisions must be the object of a genuine debate among various stakeholders, including affected individuals. 98 The work of the Access to Medicine Foundation in producing the Access to Medicine Index (AtMI), a widely respected and influential ranking of the largest pharmaceutical companies' efforts to improve access to medicine in developing countries, offers a good example in this respect. 99 One of the distinguishing features of the AtMI is the rigorous and participatory Index cycle, a two-year process of consultation with experts and stakeholders to review the previous Index and prepare the methodology for the next one. The Expert Review Committee (ERC), which functions as the strategic advisory committee for the Index methodology, is made up of individuals from a variety of stakeholder groups. To complement the work of the ERC, the Foundation hosts several events over the course of the Index cycle to gain insights on diverse perspectives and developments in the access to medicine landscape. 100 The history of the Reporting and As aiming to develop public reporting and assurance frameworks based on the UN Guiding Principles-is another example of the perceived importance of consultative processes. RAFI was launched at the beginning of 2013 as a yearly project with a primarily Asian focus. 101 After some criticism due to a lack of meaningful participatory engagement, 102 the process was lengthened and consultations were enlarged to encompass the whole world.
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v. CHALLENGES TO THE vALIdITY OF BUSINESS ANd HUMAN RIGHTS INdICATORS
Indicators can be appraised on the basis of different criteria, such as policyrelevance, cost, timeliness, and sensitiveness. This section focuses on what is widely considered the most important feature of a "good" indicator: validity. A valid indicator is an indicator that measures what it purports to measure. 104 The next two sub-parts describe the most daunting methodological and practical challenges to the production of valid indicators of corporate respect for human rights.
A. Methodological Challenges
As with any simplification and standardization process the production of indicators may result in large distortions. Two of the most important methodological challenges in producing valid business and human rights indicators are omitted variables and variance truncation.
Omitted Variables
As a proxy measure of corporate human rights performance, GRI indicator G4-HR8 asks companies to "[r]eport the total number of identified incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous peoples." 105 This indicator risks being an invalid measure of the adverse human rights impacts of corporations because it does not take into account numerous contextual factors that can affect the "score" of a company. First of all, human rights abuses can saturate. 106 For instance, a reduction in the number of incidents could result from the previous (unjustified) arrest of all indigenous leaders. What appears as a good score on G4-HR8-a low number of incidents-would not derive from an improvement of the situation, but from the perverse effects of earlier abuses. Second, data collection is inevitably biased toward events that occur, not events that are averted. Since a policy of intimidation can prevent local communities from protesting and registering complaints, less abuses can be the consequence of self-censure, rather than appropriate human rights due diligence. What appears as a good score on G4-HR8 would not derive from responsible behavior, but from a climate of repression. 107 Third, some companies have transparent complaint mechanisms and operate in countries where human rights defenders have freedom to operate. In these cases, zero-or nearly zero-abuses pass without documentation. Other companies adopt a culture of secrecy and/or operate in closed societies. In these cases, substantial abuses can remain unknown. This asymmetry produces the "paradox of human rights statistics," according to which "less information on rights violations may imply the existence of more violations." 108 What appears as a good score on G4-HR8 would not derive from few adverse human rights impacts but from lack of transparency. Many other factors can affect a company's score on G4-HR8: Some companies face more difficult environments (repressive regimes), more violent resentment (aggressive opposition), or more subtle strategies from opponents (sabotages). How should these factors be taken into account?
One potential solution to the problem of omitted variables is to not use indicators to make comparisons between companies, but only to track corporate progress over time. A company's context of operation usually does not change significantly from one year to the other, and this should allow the comparability of longitudinal scores. If one wants to compare different companies, methodological challenges can be limited by using sector-and/ or country-specific indicators. Companies operating in the same sectors and/ or countries often face similar contextual factors. Sector-or country-level indicators would therefore permit partial control of these variables. It makes much more sense to compare two mining companies operating in Chad than a mining company operating in Argentina and a garment factory with suppliers in Bangladesh. Lastly, indicators should be accompanied with contextual information in narrative form. The International Integrated Reporting <IR> Framework explicitly recognizes that "suitable quantitative indicators" should be " [p] resented with qualitative information to provide context and improve meaningfulness. Relevant qualitative information includes an explanation of: measurement methods and underlying assumptions." 109 The authors of KPI for ESG 3.0 share this view and affirm that they "are fully aware that some aspects cannot be expressed sufficiently in 'numbers alone.' Moreover, they fully accept the fact that management reserves and deserves the right to put performance data into context and provide explanations. For those aspects which require further context, Key Performance Narratives (KPN) are included. KPNs typically consist of 1-2 specific questions which call for a precise answer with a limit of words." 
Variance Truncation and False Precision
A potential problem of any measurement tool is insufficient sensitivity. Variance truncation is the degree to which collected information is forced into a limited number of categories-such as in a scale from 1 to 5-thus inevitably placing items that are different into the same category.
111 Taking  an example from One potential solution to variance truncation is the employment of wider scales. For instance, in order to populate the Euronext Vigeo Indices, Vigeo assigns a human rights score ranging from 0 to 100 to more than 2,000 companies. 113 However, this strategy risks falling victim to another problem: false precision. At the conceptual level, is it meaningful to say that two companies have freedom of association scores of 78 and 85? What does it mean to say that there is three times more freedom to unionize in one company than in another? At the practical level, more precise scores require better data. Yet, even with respect to state-focused measures, which rely on more systematic and reliable records, previous analysis has shown that "the available sources of systematic information are neither rich enough, reliable enough in type of content offered (e.g., qualitative descriptions of abusive episodes, numerical estimates of victims, etc.), nor consistent enough in the way that similar episodes are described (no matter how) either within the same country or across countries, to support a more-finely-tuned indicator than currently exists at any acceptable level of reliability."
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Translating respect for human rights into numerical scales is thus a problematic endeavor. On the one hand, small differences in human rights scores between companies or over time are unlikely to be perceived as credible measures of genuine variation; on the other hand, large differences would likely be obvious even without the use of indicators. Business and human rights indicators risk ending up documenting, in a formal way, what everybody already knows.
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B. Practical difficulties
Any good measurement relies on good information. Unfortunately, business and human rights data suffer from significant limitations. 116 The main sources of information on corporate human rights performance are corporate selfreporting and third-party documentation. 
Corporate Self-Reporting
Companies increasingly include human rights information in their sustainability reports and on their websites. 117 In addition, they sometimes release facts and figures about specific projects or countries of operation. 118 Corporate self-reporting has three important advantages: (1) Companies are evidently best placed to know their own human rights situation; (2) information is easily accessible; and (3) figures are generally standardized-because most companies report on the same issues in a similar way-and can be aggregated for comparability. Corporate self-reporting is troublesome with regard to its scope and trustworthiness. 119 First, while consistent data to populate policy indicators already exists, companies disclose little information on their human rights due diligence procedures and almost nothing on impacts (with a few exceptions, such as employee fatalities). Indeed, "It is unreasonable to expect a business enterprise to report on adverse impacts especially where they are also illegal." 120 Second, self-reported data is difficult to verify and often contested, in particular with respect to process indicators. For instance, the company may state that it has consulted with all affected stakeholders, but civil society organizations may argue that consultations excluded some vulnerable groups. An example is the conflict between Mining Watch Canada and Barrick Gold concerning, amongst other things, the consultations around the development of a grievance mechanism for the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea. 121 A partial solution to the incompleteness and unreliability of self-reporting may come from recent and ongoing regulatory innovations that require corporate disclosure of sustainability information. Today, reporting on human rights is compulsory under a "comply or explain" approach for: listed companies in the United Kingdom;
122 listed companies and non-listed companies with more 500 employees in France;
123 state-owned enterprises in Sweden; 124 state-owned enterprises, listed companies, and non-listed companies that exceed at least two of the following three size limits (total assets/liabilities of DKK 143 million, net revenue of DKK 286 million, an average of 250 full-time employees) in Denmark. 125 In April 2014, the European Parliament adopted a Directive that requires the largest 6,000 European companies to publish a non-financial statement-always under a "comply or explain" framework-containing information relating to respect for human rights, among other topics. 126 Other jurisdictions concentrate on specific human rights issues. The Netherlands requires companies that receive financial support from the state, such as export credit, to report on their efforts against child labor; 127 every retail seller and manufacturer doing business in California, and with annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed $100 million, shall disclose its efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain of tangible goods offered for sale; 128 any US person whose aggregate investment in Burma exceeds $500,000 shall provide a concise summary of its due diligence policies and procedures, including those related to risk and impact assessments, that address operational impacts on human rights, worker rights, and/or the environment in Burma. 129 The problem with these initiatives is that they offer little guidance on what exact data must be disclosed. Standardization and comparability of information are therefore not guaranteed. 130 In addition, auditors often do not possess sufficient human rights expertise to verify the truthfulness of the information reported. 131 
2.. Third-party Documentation
An increasing number of external sources-such as nongovernmental organizations, the media, international organizations, state agencies, and tribunals-offer information on the human rights performance of corporations. While third-party reports often provide invaluably forthright assessments of corporate behavior, the strategy of using these sources to produce valid business and human rights indicators suffers from numerous drawbacks. First of all, reports are frequently expressed in narrative or anecdotal form, which is difficult to aggregate and standardize for comparative purposes. 132 Second, the accuracy of the information cannot always be verified. Independent accounts are the object of contestation as fierce as corporate self-disclosure. 133 Third, these sources inevitably portray only a partial picture of a company's performance. They never cover all corporate operations, and their findings may reflect the exception-an extraordinarily rosy or gloomy picture-rather than the rule. Indeed, many human rights abuses go unnoticed because of the risks incurred by witnesses and victims (torture, disappearances, and repression), and because of the sheer number of corporations operating worldwide. Human rights scholars have long questioned the ability of human rights NGOs to comprehensively monitor human rights protection in less than 200 states. 134 What about 100,000 multinational corporations, with more than 900,000 subsidiaries, and millions of subcontractors? 135 Fourth, a lot of information is lost in translation. Kenneth Bollen counted six levels of information on human rights violations: all violations, recorded violations, known and accessible violations, locally reported violations (nation-state), internationally reported violations, and violations reported in foreign sources, such as US sources (see figure below). 136 The problem with these six layers is that some information has a higher chance of passing from one box to the next, and thus, smaller boxes are inevitably biased-that is, they do not embody a representative sample of wider reality. Examples of features affecting the likelihood of business and human rights data moving from larger to smaller boxes include: deviation from past practices (new abuses cause more condemnation than the continuation of past abuses), local information technology, openness of a region to the wider world, media coverage (which is itself dependent on wealth and strategic significance), and windows of opportunity (large brand name companies are more likely to attract media and civil society attention).
Measurement initiatives that use third-party information can employ three different tactics to offset the problems outlined above. First of all, overreliance on one type of external source should be avoided. Human rights researchers have advanced from the first attempts to measure political violence, which were based on data from the New York Times. detected through the use of statistical methods. Falsification leaves its mark on human rights records. 139 Examples of "manipulation footprints" are: lack of data on a known phenomenon, sudden jumps in related data categories, sudden cessation of a series, and suspicious proximity of data to official benchmarks. Third, standardization of data reporting and categorization would help make the most of available resources. It is particularly difficult to work with already processed data that is available from different sources using different definitions, such as newspapers, archives, police files, and reports from NGOs. The amount of work to translate this information into standardized categories is "mind-boggling." 140 The solution with respect to state violations has been the creation of a common reporting format, named HURIDOCS, which establishes uniform but flexible guidelines for data collection and reporting of human rights violations. 141 It would be particularly interesting to establish similar initiatives in the business and human rights domain via the use of harmonized forms to register events and an agreedupon vocabulary surrounding adverse corporate human rights impacts. 
vI. CHALLENGES TO THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF BUSINESS ANd HUMAN RIGHTS INdICATORS
Human rights are socially constructed norms whose fundamental objective is to give voice to the voiceless. This section explores the potential problems arising from the fact that business and human rights indicators are not technical, politically neutral tools. Rather, they can alter power relations. As indicators become increasingly central to business and human rights governance systems, "it is critical to examine how they are produced and how the forms of knowledge they create affect global power relationships." 143 First of all, as highlighted in Section IV, business and human rights norms, such as the GPs, are often too vague for unmediated translation into operational indicators. Those who are in control of the production of indicators thus tacitly, but inevitably, make important normative decisions, even if they are sold as merely objective and technical ones. 144 As highlighted by Navy Pillay, "Devising a policy or statistical indicator is not a norm or value-neutral exercise." 145 Acting in this way, the producers of indicators may surreptitiously become the winners in the struggle over the creation and acceptance of new business and human rights norms. Accordingly, more legitimate bodies, such as the Human Rights Council or national parliaments, lose out because of their inability to come up with more precise definitions.
In addition, the mere "language" of indicators, with its seemingly objective aspect, may make it more difficult for human rights abusers to be held accountable. 146 There are at least three ways in which this possibility can materialize. First, using indicators introduces a risk of condoning a low level of human rights abuses. From a human rights perspective, every adverse human rights impact is one too many; there is no need to count and measure. 147 What business and human rights indicators often do, in contrast, is give the false impression that a "good" score (for instance, a 2 in a scale from 1 to 5) equates to "good" behavior. 148 For instance, the GoodCorporation displays the score of a company on its Framework on Human Rights using traffic light colors. Few noncompliant grades guarantee a green-yellow score. Yet, any score that is not "perfect" (i.e., zero abuses) is actually "bad," and should not receive a positive endorsement, as the green color implies to the eyes of the user. Some companies might also pervert the meaning of ratings. This might be the case of best-in-class approaches, such as the one used by DJSI. Companies included in DJSI are the best in their sectors, but this does not mean that they are perfect, or that abuses do not occur: "Better than the others" does not necessarily mean "good."
Second, in some circumstances, indicators represent less powerful advocacy tools than narratives and anecdotes. 149 Focusing on the number dimension of human rights abuses can lead to losing sight of their suffering dimension. 150 For instance, a document reporting that a mining company is complicit in the displacement of 856 individuals, or that a fashion brand is associated with the death of 230 workers, will arguably not move people more than a report with pictures and personal stories of victims of the abuses. Following Meyer's advice, "To quantify is necessarily to depersonalize and even dehumanize a topic's content. The supreme value of human rights requires that one always keeps in mind the specific human costs in terms of lives, pain, and suffering that violations of rights entail." 151 Third, using indicators introduces a risk of making the contestation of misleading information more difficult. While scores and ratings are the outcome of controversial normative and methodological decisions, as seen above, they are often incorrectly presumed to be-or are presented as-scientifically objective. 152 When companies proudly announce their inclusion in the FTSE4Good, the underlying subjective bases of the index are rarely discussed. The consequence is that scores on business and human rights indicators will be difficult to challenge because of their aura of objectivity. 153 Contestation would require detailed (but not media-appealing) proof of the inaccuracy of data input and/or of the methodology used.
A promising strategy to prevent and/or mitigate these challenges is to meaningfully involve actual and potential human rights victims in the production and use of indicators. For instance, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Rights & Democracy) created a community-based HRIA tool called "Getting it Right." Its methodology gives ownership to affected communities to assess and document the potential human rights impacts that investment projects may generate. The vision for the initiative is that, by managing the HRIA, communities and stakeholders understand their rights and proactively engage in solving human rights threats by working with NGOs, companies, and governments on a more equal footing. 154 
vII. CONCLUSION
Indicators, ratings, and indices have become a distinctive feature of the global governance landscape in business and human rights, and new initiatives continue to be launched. The Wikirate Project aims to develop and maintain an open social networking system that allows Internet users to cooperatively create and share knowledge on company behavior. The objective of Wikirate is to be the "go-to" place for information on companies' social and environmental practices. Ultimately, the information will be accumulated and appropriately visualized on the website to allow users to compare and rate such companies. In October 2014, a geographically diverse group of academics, free expression and privacy advocates, technologists, and socially responsible investors-under the leadership of Rebecca MacKinnon-published a draft methodology to assess, compare, and ultimately rank the world's major information and communications technology companies on their policies and practices related to free expression and privacy. 155 The project, called "Ranking Digital Rights," aims to publish an inaugural report covering Internet and telecommunications services companies by late 2015. 156 In December 2014, a group of investors, an NGO, a think tank, and an investor research agency, announced the launch of the first wide-scale project to rank companies on their human rights performance. The project, called the "Corporate Human Rights Benchmark," will initially rank a total of 500 of the top global companies from four key sectors: Agriculture, ICT, Apparel, and Extractives. 157 Also in December 2014, BankTrack launched a report titled "Banking with Principles: Benchmarking Banks against the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights." The study assessed how well banks are implementing the GPs into their own operations, policies, and reporting. To do this, BankTrack benchmarked thirty-two large global banks against a set of twelve criteria. These criteria fall into four categories: policy commitment, due diligence commitment, reporting, and access to remedy. 158 Against a backdrop of growing interest in business and human rights indicators, this article mapped the most representative measurement initiatives on the topic and explored a number of normative, methodological, practical, and political challenges to the production of valid and emancipatory measures of corporate respect for human rights. In addition, it suggested some considerations that may overcome potential skepticism:
• tracking progress over time is less problematic than comparing scores across companies; HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
• participatory and transparent processes can alleviate the problems associated with controversial normative decisions and power shifts to unaccountable bodies;
• sector-and country-specific indicators can diminish the irregularities deriving from omitted variables and information bias; and
• the strategy of accompanying scores with narrative explanations of the company's contexts of operation can help avoid the political risks linked to an overreliance upon self-contained, seemingly objective, quantitative expressions.
159
Returning to standard-based measures and surveys, so far neglected by the business and human rights community, might also represent a fruitful strategy. Standard-based measures use expert judgment to transform qualitative human rights information into a "score" on a "standardized scale that typically is both ordinal and limited in range." 160 These types of measures are widely used to compare states' human rights practices. For instance, the Political Terror Scale relies on two researchers to code countries on a scale from 1 to 5 (the higher the number, the graver the violation) on the basis of qualitative narratives found in the annual human rights reports published by Amnesty International and the US State Department. 161 The absence of reliable data on corporate human rights abuses worldwide precludes the creation of standard-based indicators of adverse human rights impacts. Yet, it seems feasible to produce standard-based scales for the human rights policies and processes of, at the very least, the largest multinational corporations. 162 Experts might be called on to assign a score to the corporate policies on the basis of the standards included in the GPs, such as reach within and outside the company, the scope of human rights referred to, and level of adoption. In the near future, this might also become viable with respect to human rights processes. Experts may be called on to compare the due diligence procedures disclosed under the US Reporting Requirements on cal objectives or minimize some problems out of fear of repercussions. 169 Third, difficulties with sampling frame and sampling strategy are common: Developing countries may have no census, and it might be difficult to reach disadvantaged population. 170 Yet, a strong argument in favor of surveys is validity: Surveys elicit the views of the ultimate beneficiaries of improved human rights norms. According to the GPs: "To enable business enterprises to assess their human rights impacts accurately, [companies] should seek to understand the concerns of potentially affected stakeholders by consulting them directly..." 171 This could also be used against those corporations that dismiss external expert assessments of governance as uninformed pontification by outsiders. 172 The conclusion of this article is that, while business and human rights indicators have great potential, we should proceed with care. Most existing initiatives lack the legitimacy to make potentially controversial normative decisions and can disempower vulnerable stakeholders. In addition, methodological and practical problems seriously affect the validity of their scores. Yet, this should not discourage attempts to overcome these challenges. The production of indicators triggers two fundamental processes in the nascent business and human rights field: clarification of norms and collection of information. First, while the scope of states' duties to protect human rights is relatively well defined today, the exact requirements and limits of corporate responsibility regarding human rights are still unclear in many circumstances. The creation of indicators requires answering difficult questions on how to move from general principles to operational policies, how to balance balance difficult trade-offs between different responsibilities, and how to set corporate priorities. 173 Second, the business and human rights community is often stuck with a "chicken and egg" question: In a bad political atmosphere, it cannot obtain good data, but good data is needed to improve the atmosphere itself. The creation of indicators requires the disclosure of information that would not be produced or released otherwise.
The final call is for more research on the validity and the emancipatory potential of specific measurement initiatives. 174 The business and human rights community risks falling victim to the erroneous "article of faith" that some data are better than no data. 175 Yet, indicators are only tools, not ends in themselves. They can be seen "as a crutch, indispensable, but still a crutch . . . if it is not proportioned to the needs of the user, it can hinder as well as help." 176 The question is therefore not whether to produce business and human rights indicators-as recognized more than twenty-five years ago by Richard Claude and Thomas Jabine, "[I]t now seems clear that although measurement might not represent the central feature, it must play a role in studying, assessing, and planning for human rights" 177 -but how to do that while conforming with the objective of giving power to the powerless.
